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TRADABLE PATENT RIGHTS 
Ian Ayres* & Gideon Parchomovsky** 
Patent thickets may inefficiently retard cumulative innovation. This Article 
explores two alternative mechanisms that may be used to weed out patent 
thickets. Both mechanisms are intended to reduce the number of patents in our 
society. The first mechanism we discuss is price-based regulation of patents 
through a system of increasing renewal fees. The second and more innovative 
mechanism is quantity-based regulation through the establishment of a system of 
Tradable Patent Rights. The formalization of tradable patent rights would 
essentially create a secondary market for patent permits in which patent 
protection will be bought and sold. The Article then discusses how price and 
quantity regulation can be combined to effect superior weeding. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to a famous academic anecdote, in the 1960s Ronald Coase was 
invited to participate in a panel discussion on pollution. His copanelists (who 
since that time have fallen into oblivion) were a radical environmentalist who 
* Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. 
** Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Professor, Bar Ilan 
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passionately argued that pollution is the worst problem to ever face humanity 
and an equally extreme conservative who vehemently denied that pollution 
even exists. When it was Coase’s turn to speak, he reportedly slowly turned his 
head and said, “I am sure that pollution exists, I know that much; what I do not 
know is whether we have enough of it.”1 
A substantially identical question to that which bothered Coase about four 
decades ago now preoccupies patent theorists. But, unlike Coase, who did not 
know whether we had enough pollution—or, more precisely, enough of the 
underlying activities from which pollution results—patent scholars seem to 
believe that we have too many patents. Patents are supposed to promote 
innovation, and virtually all economists agree that “innovation is the main 
driver of economic growth.”2 But there is a growing concern that the modern 
patent system actually chills, not promotes, innovation. In recent years, 
aggressive filing patterns by private firms and excessively loose standards of 
review at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)3 have 
combined to produce an unprecedented proliferation of patents.4 A particularly 
disconcerting result of the increase in the number of patents is the emergence of 
patent thickets: multiple patents that cover a single product or technology.5 
Patent thickets can be found in several key industries, such as semiconductors, 
biotechnology, computer software, and the Internet.6 
Patent thickets are especially harmful in cumulative innovation settings. In 
such settings, the need to secure licenses from multiple patentees, each 
1. One of us heard the story from Bruce Lehmann, a former student of Ronald Coase 
and currently a professor at the University of California, San Diego, in a presentation he 
gave at the Business Method Patents and Financial Services conference that was organized 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in April 2003. The conference program with a link 
to an outline of Professor Lehmann’s presentation is available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/ 
invoke.cfm?objectid=A6BDAC9C-384A-4C59-9096A079D324A9B7&method=display.  
2. See, e.g., DAVID WARSH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: A STORY OF 
ECONOMIC DISCOVERY (2006) (discussing the importance of innovation to economic growth).  
3. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: 
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
577, 589-90 (1999) (discussing the poor quality of patent applications in terms of the number 
and nature of prior art references). 
4. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 107 (2003); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, 
Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17 (2005) (“Notwithstanding the high private cost of 
patent protection and the relatively low expected value of individual patents, the number of 
filings in the U.S. (and worldwide) continues to increase.”). For more specific discussion 
that includes figures, see infra Part I. 
5. The term “patent thicket” probably originated in the 1970s in a series of cases 
involving Xerox’s patents. See Gavin Clarkson, Objective Identification of Patent Thickets: 
A Network Analytic Approach (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Business 
School) (on file with author).  
6. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. 
eds., 2001), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf. 
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possessing a veto power over the production of new innovation (1) dramatically 
increases bargaining costs between patentees and subsequent innovators; (2) 
creates a potential for hold-ups; and (3) lowers the profits of the original 
patentees. Patent thickets also harm regular users of patented products and 
technology by making it more expensive for users to gain access to the relevant 
product or technology. 
Economists and legal scholars have advanced various mechanisms to 
mitigate the harmful effects of patent thickets. Carl Shapiro has suggested that 
cross licensing and patent pools can be effective in reducing patent thickets and 
has called for the relaxation of various antitrust doctrines to accommodate 
those arrangements.7 Other economists, such as Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner, 
and legal scholars have focused their search on solutions for the USPTO and 
recommended various reforms in the standards of patent examination in order 
to better screen for valid patents.8 Finally, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have 
called for different application of equitable rules in different industries.9 This 
proposal would lead to a dramatic shortening of patent terms in various 
industries, which in turn, would reduce the overall number of valid patents. 
In this Article, we seek to explore two alternative mechanisms that may be 
used to weed out patent thickets. Both mechanisms are intended to reduce the 
number of patents in our society. The first mechanism we discuss is price-based 
regulation of patents through a system of renewal fees. Renewal fees are 
already being used in the United States and foreign countries.10 Empirical 
studies show that even very modest renewal fees have prompted patentees to 
abandon patents,11 thereby reducing the number of patents with which 
subsequent innovators need to contend. The discussion of renewal fees will 
therefore focus on ways to improve the workings of the existing system. 
The second and more innovative mechanism is quantity-based regulation 
through the establishment of a system of tradable patent rights. The 
formalization of tradable patent rights will essentially create a secondary 
market for patent permits in which patent protection will be bought and sold. 
While this proposal may seem at first radical and far-fetched, it should be borne 
in mind that a similar system has been implemented in the context of industrial 
pollution.12 The introduction of tradable emission permits for sulfur dioxide 
7. Id. 
8. E.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 171-72, 178 (2004).  
9. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1631-32 (2003); see id. at 1578-79 (suggesting that patent law should be tailored to the needs 
of specific industries). 
10. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.6 (2007); European Patent Convention art. 86, Oct. 5, 1973, 
1065 U.N.T.S. 199. 
11. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 14. 
12. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1341-42 (1985) (proposing tradable emissions permits as an alternative 
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(SO2) in the 1990 Amendments to Title VI of the Clean Air Act resulted in a 
dramatic improvement in air quality and is viewed by economists and 
environmentalists alike as a success story. Furthermore, it is widely believed 
that the use of tradable permits can solve other environmental problems such as 
depletion of ocean fisheries.13 Tradable rights systems induce actors to behave 
in a more socially desirable fashion by imposing quantity limits and inducing 
voluntary rights transfers from less efficient to more efficient users. 
A similar mechanism may be adopted to reduce the “informational haze” 
produced by patent thickets. Policymakers can set a cap on the overall number 
of patents14—or, more precisely, the overall number of years of patent 
protection—and institute a system of tradable patent rights. Doing so will 
induce holders of low-value patents to sell their rights to higher value 
inventors, thereby improving the efficiency of the entire patent system. 
Likewise, such a system will prompt new patentees to purchase the right 
amount of protection. Patentees will be able to acquire one, five, or fifteen 
years of protection depending on the commercial success of their inventions. 
Valueless patents will be abandoned, clearing the path for newer, more 
valuable inventions. Over time, this process will weed out patent thickets, as 
valueless and low-value patents are relinquished. 
Implementation of the proposed solution will effect a dramatic shift in the 
existing patent system. While patentees will continue to submit their 
applications to the review of the USPTO, approval will no longer mean an 
automatic fixed term of twenty years. Instead, successful applicants will need 
to purchase tradable patent licenses either from the USPTO or on the secondary 
market and will be able to tailor the protection term to their specific needs.15 
The price of the protection will be determined by the forces of supply and 
demand, not by administrative fiat. 
The remainder of the Article consists of three parts. Part I discusses the 
burgeoning phenomenon of patent thickets and its adverse effect on innovation. 
Part II explains how price- and quantity-based regulation may arrest the 
development of patent thickets. We first assess each of the mechanisms on a 
stand-alone basis and then consider the possibility of combining them in order 
to achieve optimal weeding. Part III addresses the issue of implementation by 
to command-and-control regulation).  
13. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
14. Admittedly, determining what the cap should be is a difficult task. In this sense, the 
analogy between industrial pollution and patents is imperfect. In the context of industrial 
pollution, the cap was set based on careful environmental research. There is no analogous 
way to determine the desirable quantity of patents. We have not yet figured out a way to 
measure the optimal level of innovation in our society. In this Article, we use the current 
level of patent protection, i.e., the total number of patent years, as the baseline cap. Of 
course, this number might prove too high or too low but over time it may be adjusted 
through a process of trial and error. 
15. See discussion infra Part III. 
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proposing a way to introduce a tradable patent rights regime. A short 
conclusion follows. 
I. PATENT THICKETS AND THEIR COSTS 
This Part explores the burgeoning phenomenon of patent thickets and its 
adverse effect on innovation. It then surveys the academic responses to the 
problem. 
A. Patent Thickets 
Recent years have seen a dramatic change in patent scholarship. 
Traditionally, patent scholarship focused, by and large, on the price effects of 
patent protection. The main problem theorists noted was that patent protection 
allowed patentees to engage in supracompetitive pricing, generating a social 
deadweight loss. This line of analysis suggested that patent protection involves 
a fundamental tradeoff between dynamic and static efficiency: patents spur 
innovation but only at the cost of distorted pricing. The normative challenge, 
therefore, was to design policy mechanisms that would minimize the market 
power of certain patentees without unduly diminishing research and 
development (R&D) incentives.16 
Through time, patent theorists gradually turned their attention away from 
static to dynamic efficiency costs. That is, they adjusted their focus away from 
the deadweight loss generated by patent protection and shifted it to a different 
problem: the chilling effect of patents on innovation. The dramatic growth in 
the number of issued patents has prompted a concern that the modern patent 
system hinders technological progress, and hence retards dynamic efficiency. 
In particular, the desire of patentees to build strong patent portfolios, coupled 
with the poor quality of review by the USPTO and the laxity with which it 
16. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 
122-24 (2003) (suggesting ways to improve the workings of patent prizes); Ian Ayres & Paul 
Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The 
Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 987 
(1999) (proposing a system of probabilistic patents to limit patentees’ market power); 
Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 
1137, 1147-48 (1998) (describing an auction mechanism that allows for the compensation of 
inventors without creating deadweight loss); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why 
the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 123, 124-25 (1997) (explaining how awarding subsidies to users of pharmaceutical 
drugs can reduce the deadweight loss associated with patent protection);  
Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 
J.L. & ECON. 525, 525-29 (2001) (discussing the possibility of replacing intellectual property 
rights with a system of rewards). 
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grants patents, have dramatically increased the cost of follow-on innovation in 
our society.17 
Between 1990 and 2003, the number of U.S. filings more than doubled 
from 176,264 to 366,043, and the number of issued patents grew from 99,077 
to 187,015.18 Importantly, the dramatic rise in the number of filings and patent 
grants is not fully attributable to greater investments in R&D. Rather, it stems 
in large part from a conscious effort by firms to maximize the number of 
patents per R&D dollar.19 The case of IBM is illustrative. From 1994 to 2003, 
IBM received a total of 24,685 U.S. patents,20 setting new records for the most 
U.S. patents received in a single year,21 despite the fact that over the same 
period IBM slashed its research budget.22 As befits an industry leader, IBM set 
17. See generally Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent 
U.S. Patent Reform, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 147 (2002) (reviewing the literature and 
suggesting that poorer review standards induce the creation of patent thickets). 
18. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT AND STATISTICS CHART 
CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2006 (2007), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/ 
us_stat.htm. 
19. To be sure, total R&D expenditures have grown even more dramatically in recent 
years. See SUMIYE OKUBO ET AL., BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, R&D SATELLITE ACCOUNT: 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES A-30 tbl.4.2 (2006), available at http://www.bea.gov/rd/xls/ 
1959_2002_rd_data.xls (showing a 133% rise in real R&D investment over the period 1990 
to 2002). The fact that R&D investment has outpaced growth in patent grants is not 
inconsistent with the proposition that firms are maximizing patents per dollar. Instead, these 
data likely also reflect an increase in the cost of R&D. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The 
Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 
168 tbl.4 (2003) (finding an annual increase of 7.4% of drug development costs from 1980-
1990). Our point here is that we would expect R&D expenditure growth to outpace growth in 
patent grants even more in the absence of patent thickets. 
20. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Releases Annual List 
of Top 10 Organizations Receiving Most U.S. Patents (Jan. 12, 2004) (on file with authors); 
Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Releases Annual List of Top 10 
Organizations Receiving Most U.S. Patents (Jan. 13, 2003) (on file with authors); Press 
Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Releases Annual List of Top 10 
Organizations Receiving Most U.S. Patents (Jan. 10, 2002) (on file with authors); Press 
Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Releases Annual List of 10 Organizations 
Receiving Most Patents (Jan. 10, 2001) (on file with authors); Press Release, U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, IBM Repeats of PTO’s Annual List of 10 Organizations Receiving Most 
Patents (Jan. 11, 2000) (on file with authors); Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, IBM Repeats at Top of PTO’s Annual List of 10 Organizations Receiving Most 
Patents (Jan. 8, 1999) (on file with authors); Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
USPTO Announces Top Patent Earners (Jan. 12, 1998) (on file with authors); Press Release, 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Announces Last Year’s Top Patent Earners (Jan. 
21, 1997) (on file with authors); Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO 
Press Release on Top Patent Earners (Jan. 30, 1996) (on file with authors); History of IBM, 
1994, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/history/year_1994.html; see also Parchomovsky 
& Wagner, supra note 4, at 46 n.147. 
21. Press Release, IBM, IBM Breaks U.S. Patent Record (Jan. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www-03.ibm.com/industries/education/doc/content/news/pressrelease/ 
992547110.html.  
22. See Robert Buderi, Into the Big Blue Yonder, TECH. REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 48. 
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the standard for other companies. Realizing the importance of elaborate patent 
holdings, firms began to seek patents on various aspects of the same product or 
technology. For example, the technology underlying Adobe’s Acrobat Reader 
6.0 is protected by as many as forty-one different patents (which you can see 
scroll by each time the software loads). Worse yet, some companies adopted 
the practice of “patent flooding,” which entails filing dozens, sometimes 
hundreds, of applications on every conceivable improvement on a broad basic 
invention patented by a rival company.23 
Responsibility for the explosion of patents does not fall exclusively on 
patentees; the USPTO also shoulders part of the blame. A careful examination 
process might have curbed the filing frenzy. Unfortunately, the USPTO’s 
review of patent applications is anything but comprehensive; scholars who 
studied the USPTO expressed great concern about the quality of review of 
patent applications by the USPTO. The main findings were that the USPTO is 
both underfunded and understaffed. On average, patent examiners spend only 
eighteen hours on each application. Moreover, due to the reward structure in 
the USPTO, examiners have a clear financial incentive to approve applications 
they review. As a result, dubious applications that should have been rejected 
often pass muster with the USPTO.24 Overwhelmed by the rising tide of 
filings, the USPTO has failed to perform adequately its gatekeeping duties and 
thereby contributed to the proliferation of pate
B. The Cost of Patent Thickets 
The proliferation of patents is not without a cost. The aggressive pursuit of 
patents over any innovation, large or small, has given rise to the phenomenon 
of “patent thickets.” A patent thicket occurs when a technology or a product is 
covered by multiple patents that are often held by numerous patentees.25 To see 
why patent thickets chill innovation, it is first necessary to understand the 
nature of technological progress. Innovation in most technological sectors is a 
cumulative process. As Joseph Stiglitz observed, “[W]e have an innovation 
system in which one innovation builds on another.”26 In our system, new 
inventors have the benefit of the insights made by their predecessors. But 
23. This practice was common in Japan. Sri Krishna Sankaran, Patent Flooding in the 
United States and Japan, 40 IDEA 393, 393-94 (2000). 
24. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997) (claiming one-click 
online shopping); U.S. Patent No. 6,289,319 (filed Nov. 30, 1994) (claiming online credit 
card payments); U.S. Patent No. 5,715,314 (filed Oct. 24, 1994) (claiming online shopping 
carts).  
25. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 119. Shapiro defines a patent thicket as “a dense web of 
overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to 
actually commercialize new technology.” Id. at 120. 
26. Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition Before Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Case No. P951201 (1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/ 
GC101295.shtm. 
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enlightenment comes at a price. Patents confer on their holders property rule 
protection, namely, the power to exclude others from the underlying invention. 
Any person who wishes to improve upon a patented invention must either 
secure permission from the patentee or risk harsh consequences. 
In a sense, the problems created by patent thickets are not completely new. 
The patent system grants property rights to patent holders, allowing them to 
prevent the use of their patent by future innovators. In the past, overbroad 
patents held by a single individual have had the effect of stifling innovation. 
For example, in 1895 George Selden was issued a patent for his “Road 
Engine,”27 which included the already common concept of placing a gasoline 
engine on a chassis to create a car. Selden’s patent was enforced against upstart 
automakers for sixteen years before being narrowed by a court, and the patent 
stifled the production and development of automobiles during that time.28 
Selden’s vigorous enforcement strategy demonstrates the power that a single, 
well-situated patent holder can exercise over the development of an entire 
industry. The modern patent thicket phenomenon has the potential to grant that 
same power to many different patent holders, all of whom may control 
exclusive rights to integral pieces of innovation. Patent thickets already pervade 
several key industries in our economy, including biotechnology,29 
nanotechnology,30 computer software, and the Internet.31 
Computer software and the Internet have suffered the most so far. 
Computer programming has very low barriers to entry when compared to 
traditional businesses and especially high-tech fields like nanotechnology or 
biotechnology. Major developments in computer science often occur quickly 
and are spearheaded by heretofore unknown businesses with relatively little 
capital.32 The software industry also tends to progress on an incremental and 
cumulative basis;33 it is rare and expensive to develop completely original 
software. Additionally, the USPTO has become more willing to grant patents 
27. U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (filed May 8, 1879) (issued Nov. 5, 1895). 
28. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 3 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.  
29. See id., ch. 3, at 29 (concluding that the proliferation of biotechnology patents may 
hinder future innovation). 
30. Since most nanotechnology is not yet commercially viable, there has not been 
significant litigation regarding overlapping patents so far. However, the pattern of patenting 
in nanotechnology closely resembles other fields that are experiencing patent thickets, and 
some commentators fear that it is only a matter of time before the issue arises in 
nanotechnology. See, e.g., Liz Gannes, Nanotech Patents Proliferate, RED HERRING, Apr. 
20, 2005, http://www.redherring.com/Home/11866. 
31. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 120-21. 
32. The success stories of Microsoft and Google are two of many such examples in the 
software field. 
33. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28, ch. 3, at 44-45. 
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for “business methods,” which often incorporate simple ideas already in 
widespread use and are difficult to invent around or otherwise avoid.34 
As a result, many software companies find it next to impossible to operate 
without some form of patent infringement. One member of the software 
industry undertook a search for existing patents relevant to his business and 
identified 120 that appeared to overlap and upon which his company was 
infringing.35 Others have been reluctant to even undertake such a search, for 
fear that knowledge of the existing patents would leave them open to 
willfulness claims and significantly increased damages in the event of future 
litigation.36 
 The situation in the semiconductor industry is not much better. As Jaffe 
and Lerner report: “The problem with patents in this industry is that there is so 
much overlap among the technologies developed by different companies that it 
is difficult to bring any product to market without potentially infringing patents 
held by other companies.”37 
When a technology is covered by multiple patents, the improver “must 
hack its way through [the patent thicket] in order to actually commercialize 
new technology.”38 In this case, an improver must obtain permission from all 
relevant patentees. Alternatively, the improver can try to invent around all the 
relevant patents and thereby avoid the need to negotiate permissions. Finally, 
the improver can ignore all pre-existing patents, go ahead and commercialize 
her innovation, and expose herself, ex post, to multiple patent infringement 
suits.39 
Securing permission from all relevant right holders involves two types of 
costs: information costs and negotiation costs. To secure the licenses necessary 
to produce the improvement, an improver must first obtain information about 
all blocking patents and their holders. In other words, she must identify the 
relevant patents that comprise the thicket and determine who owns them. This 
would require the improver to pore over numerous patents, determine their 
validity, and assess their scope. Since the language of patent claims is often 
technical and vague, the foregoing tasks may require the hiring of one or more 
34. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 120-21. These “business method” patents have gone 
as far as to include a patent granted to Sightsound.com for the sale of downloadable music or 
video over the Internet. Id. 
35. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28, ch. 3, at 52; cf. James Bessen & Robert M. 
Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Working 
Papers Research Dep’t, Working Paper No. 03-17/R, 2004) (reporting that the increase in 
patent filings in the software industry is positively correlated with a decline in investment in 
R&D). But see Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 999-1009 (2005) (suggesting that intense patenting in the industry does 
not stifle research and that patents actually help small firms). 
36.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28, ch. 3, at 49. 
37. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 8, at 59. 
38. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 120. 
39. Id. at 125. 
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legal or technical experts. Unfortunately, even a very careful review of all 
issued patents would not completely protect the intended innovator from the 
threat of infringement suits because many pending patent applications are not 
available to the public. The USPTO publishes patent applications eighteen 
months after their filing,40 and until that time the public is kept in the dark 
about their content. As a result, regardless of their investment in information, 
follow-on innovators are always exposed to some risk of inadvertent 
infringements. 
After reviewing all publicly available patents, the improver can either 
negotiate licenses from the owner or design around the pre-existing patents. 
Consider the negotiation option first. As Carl Shapiro has pointed out, patent 
thickets present a classic complements problem.41 Since each patent holder has 
a property right in a key input and the improver needs to produce her 
innovation, the improver must purchase licenses from all the patent holders. 
Each patent holder may thus be viewed as a monopolist who controls an input 
necessary for the production of the improvement. 
Even if one sets aside for the moment the problem of strategic behavior, a 
simple numeric example can illustrate how the need to secure multiple licenses 
can stifle follow-on innovation. Suppose that a follow-on innovator 
contemplates a new product that is expected to yield a profit of $500, net of 
R&D costs. To produce the product, the innovator must invest $120 to search 
for pre-existing patents and then secure licenses from twenty different 
patentees. The cost of every negotiation process is $5, and the license fee is 
$15. Given that the cost of securing the necessary permissions ($520) exceeds 
the expected return on the investment ($500), the cumulative innovation will 
not be produced and society will be deprived of a valuable product. 
Worse yet, when a manufacturer must purchase two key inputs from two 
different monopolists, the resulting price would be higher than the price that 
would prevail if the two inputs were controlled and sold by a single monopolist 
firm. Shapiro posits that this same double-markup problem applies “when 
multiple companies control blocking patents for a particular product, process, 
or business method.”42 Hence, cumulative innovators who face a patent thicket 
will pay higher license fees. On the margin, the higher fees may not leave 
enough profits to justify the investment in the innovation. 
Finally, economic theory predicts that negotiations between cumulative 
innovators and patentees will be plagued by holdout problems. Each patent 
holder can block the new innovation by withholding consent and thus can ask 
for the entire expected value of the new innovation in exchange for her consent. 
Furthermore, due to information asymmetries, the asking price of patentees 
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring the PTO, subject to a few narrow 
exceptions, to publish a patent application eighteen months after its filing date). 
41. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 123. 
42. Id. (emphasis added). 
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may be higher than the actual value of the innovation. If the cumulative 
innovator cannot invent around any of the relevant patents, even one holdout 
case is sufficient to stop the new innovation from being produced. 
The holdout problem generated by patent thickets is a mere instance of a 
general problem in property theory. As Michael Heller pointed out, when 
multiple, dispersed property rights cover a resource, the resource will be 
underused.43 In a subsequent contribution, Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg 
applied that basic insight to biotechnological research. They argued that the 
proliferation of blocking patents in that area causes underuse of basic research 
findings and generates “a tragedy of the anticommons.”44 
The problem of patent thickets also explains why the proliferation of even 
relatively low-value patents imposes social costs. One might initially suppose 
that the proliferation of patent grants is unproblematic because only a small 
fraction of patents have any significant social economic value.45 Since most 
patents are worthless, you might think that no one would bother to infringe. But 
the patent thicket argument shows that even probabilistically worthless patents 
can do social harm. Low-value patents in the midst of a patent thicket can still 
stifle future innovation. An improver must innovate around a blocking patent or 
negotiate with its holder even if the patent, standing alone, has no economic 
value.46 Moreover, the possibility of holdout creates incentives for inventors to 
obtain and maintain blocking patents that have low intrinsic value for the 
purpose of positioning themselves to take advantage of negotiations with future 
innovators. These blocking patents thus remain obstacles to future innovation 
and impose social costs despite their low economic value. 
Renewal fees or the cost of acquiring tradable patent permits can usefully 
weed the thicket of blocking patents. Imagine in the foregoing example that the 
twenty patents were initially acquired solely for their blocking potential, and at 
the time of initial acquisition their blocking potential varied from five to ten 
percent. Renewal fees will not deter acquisition of patents with sufficiently 
high probability of blocking. If there is a 100% chance that patenting today will 
give rise to a subsequent licensing fee from a follow-on innovator, the initial 
inventor is still likely to patent even if the only profit is from a blocking 
license. But renewal or permit fees will deter the low-probability or marginal 
patents. An initial patentee with only a five or ten percent chance of being paid 
43. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622-23 (1998). 
44. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998). 
45. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1507 (2001) (estimating that only five percent of issued patents are licensed for a 
royalty); see also Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 
YALE J. ON REG. 359, 385 (1999) (“Most infringed patents are not worth defending in court . 
. . . Even in the pharmaceutical industry, where patents are most valuable, eight out of ten 
patents typically produce no value for their holders.”). 
46. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 120. 
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by a follow-on innovator will be much less likely to pay the price of the 
renewal or permit fee. The follow-on innovator (and society) wins because the 
costs of negotiation and failed holdouts are reduced. 
While economists and legal scholars debate the prevalence of holdouts in 
actual cumulative innovation settings,47 it should be noted that even if in the 
real world patentees rarely stop cumulative innovators dead in their tracks by 
withholding consent, the potential for holdouts increases transaction costs for 
cumulative innovators. Depending on the profit margin, this increase may cause 
the cumulative innovator to forego the new innovation. Furthermore, the 
potential for holdouts may deter innovators from assaying to produce the new 
innovation. 
Instead of negotiating with multiple patentees, cumulative innovators can 
try to invent around the patent thicket. In many cases, however, inventing 
around may prove impossible or as costly as negotiating. First, while inventing 
around substitutes for negotiation, it does not lower information costs. 
Inventing around requires a careful study of the patents around which the new 
innovation is to be designed. Second and more importantly, it would often be 
impracticable or not cost-effective to invent around patent thickets. Inventing 
around a patent thicket would often require a new technological or conceptual 
breakthrough that most innovators are incapable of achieving.48 
Of course, cumulative innovators can adopt a mixed strategy of inventing 
around certain patents while licensing others. It is far from clear, however, that 
this mixed strategy would improve their lot. To begin with, the need to 
negotiate reintroduces the potential for holdouts. Moreover, the combined cost 
of inventing around and negotiating may render the new innovation unworthy 
of commercializing. Finally, in contrast to licensing, inventing around a patent 
leaves cumulative innovators exposed to the risk of litigation. Litigation may 
arise either because the effort to invent around was not completely successful 
47. For articles suggesting that the problem is very real and acute, see, for example, 
Shapiro, supra note 6; Gregory J. Glover, Patent Thickets and Innovation Markets Reviewed, 
26 NAT’L L.J., Oct. 14, 2002, at C10; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 44; Bessen & Hunt, 
supra note 35; James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies 
(Research on Innovation, Working Paper No. 0401, 2004); Robert Hunt, When Do More 
Patents Reduce R&D? (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Working Papers Research Dep’t, 
Working Paper No. 06-6, 2006). For the opposite view, see Richard A. Epstein, Steady the 
Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE 
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 153, 166-68 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003); and John P. Walsh, Ashish 
Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical 
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 285 (Wesley M. Cohen & 
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003). 
48. But see Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical 
Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 663 (2004) (“By raising the cost of ‘doing science’ within an 
established paradigm, however, patents encourage scientists to create alternate theories of 
how natural phenomena operate, theories whose investigation does not depend on using 
patented research tools.”). 
  
December 2007] TRADABLE PATENT RIGHTS 875 
 
or because of strike suits by opportunistic patentees who enjoy relative cost 
advantages in litigation. 
Kodak’s attempt to invent around Polaroid’s patent provides a striking 
example of the risk inherent in this strategy. For years, Polaroid controlled the 
instant camera market. In order to solidify its market position the firm acquired 
multiple patents on its inventions. In 1969 Kodak decided to enter the instant 
camera market. Kodak consciously decided that it would not infringe any of 
Polaroid’s patents. To this end, Kodak worked closely with its patent attorney 
in order to develop a technology that gets around Polaroid’s patents. After 
years of preparations, in 1986 Kodak entered the market. A week later it was 
sued by Polaroid for multiple patent infringements. The legal battle between the 
two companies took years and ended tragically for Kodak. Despite its best 
efforts, Kodak was held liable for seven patent infringements. The court issued 
an injunction against the company, forcing it to shut down its plant and lay off 
employees, which Kodak had argued would cause the company to lose 
hundreds of millions of dollars.49  
In principle, cumulative innovators have another option still: they can 
simply ignore all blocking patents, commercialize the new innovation, and deal 
with infringement suits after the fact. This option is the least desirable of all. By 
sinking money into the commercialization of an infringing product, the 
cumulative innovator only makes herself an easier prey for patent holders. 
After an innovation has been commercialized and put to a large-scale 
production, patentees can seek far greater royalty fees by threatening to shut 
down production.50 Hence, only cumulative innovators who can fend off 
litigation may consider adopting this course of action. Most cumulative 
innovators, however, cannot afford to take the risk.51 
The adverse effects of patent thickets are not limited to follow-on 
innovators. Patent thickets also lower the returns of the patentees whose patents 
compose the thickets. Complementary monopolies not only raise prices for 
downstream manufacturers but also lower the profits of the monopolists 
themselves.52 In cumulative innovation settings, this result is not surprising. 
Patentees’ return on innovation depends in part on the licensing fees they 
collect from follow-on innovators and consumers. As we explained, when a 
technology or a product gets entangled in a patent thicket, the cost of using it 
goes up and licensing fees go down. Consequently, the emergence of a patent 
49. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 8, at 113-14.  
50. The threat is credible in this case as injunctive relief is a standard remedy for 
patent infringement. See id. at 111 (“Perhaps the most dramatic way in which the [Federal 
Circuit] has strengthened the remedies available to patentees is the availability of 
preliminary injunctive relief.”). 
51. For an analysis of litigation trends in patent law, see Parchomovsky & Wagner, 
supra note 4, at 63-64. 
52. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 123. 
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thicket might prevent original patentees from recouping their investment in 
innovation. Thus, patent thickets put a drag on all levels of innovation. 
Finally, patent thickets also harm users of patented products and 
technologies. Not only do patent thickets raise the cost of certain patented 
products and technologies to consumers but they also create uncertainty as to 
the legal rights in such products and technologies. When a technology is 
covered by a single patent, the licensor is readily identifiable. When, on the 
other hand, a technology is covered by multiple patents that are held by 
multiple patentees, potential users find themselves in a bind. They can either try 
to navigate the patent thickets in an attempt to sort out which patentees should 
be contacted or simply obtain licenses from all the patentees who staked a 
claim to the technology. Per our earlier discussion, it should be clear that either 
option implicates a considerable cost. 
C. Extant Academic Responses 
The problem of patent thickets has not escaped the attention of theorists. 
Academics have proposed several ways to mitigate the harm occasioned by 
patent thickets. As always, these proposals may be divided into two broad 
categories: ex post solutions and ex ante solutions. Generally, the ex post 
solutions contemplate various transactional mechanisms that would induce 
more cooperative behavior and sharing of patent rights. In an influential article, 
Shapiro argued that cross licensing and patent pools are “natural and effective 
methods . . . to cut through the patent thicket.”53 Accordingly, he recommended 
that our antitrust laws be relaxed to accommodate these currently illegal 
arrangements.54 
The ex ante solutions, by contrast, focus on the need to change the process 
and standards by which patents are granted. Perturbed by the ease with which 
patents are granted, some scholars have argued for a substantive reform of the 
USPTO and the introduction of a more rigid examination process. In a recent 
article, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley proposed a different mode of intervention 
that targets patent terms. In particular, they called for the abolition of the 
current uniform protection term and its replacement with a differential 
protection term that is tailored to specific industry needs. Accordingly, software 
patents will receive a relatively short protection term while pharmaceutical 
53. Id. at 119.  
54. Id.; see also Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: 
The Case of Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 123 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus et al. eds., 
2001); Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and 
Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1997, at 8; 
Josh Lerner, Jean Tirole & Marcin Strojwas, Cooperative Market Agreements Between 
Competitors: Evidence from Patent Pools (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 9680, 2003).  
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patents will get a longer protection term. But while the protection term will 
vary among industries (or technological sectors), all patents in the same 
industry will receive the same protection term.55 
In the remainder of the Article, we wish to contribute to the burgeoning 
academic exchange by examining two alternative methods of intervention that 
can help thin patent thickets. The first is regulation of patent “prices” through a 
system of patent renewal fees; the second is quantity-based regulation that 
seeks to establish a market for patents through the introduction of tradable 
patent rights (TPRs). 
II. PRICES V. QUANTITIES 
Part I established the case for weeding out patent thickets. This Part asks: 
what is the best means of reducing the number of patents that are in effect? 
Perhaps the most obvious means of reducing the number of patents would be to 
heighten the requirements for patentability—for example, requiring more in the 
way of non-obvious improvement over the prior art.56 But instead of relying on 
the judgments of patent examiners ex ante or judges ex post, it is possible to 
economize on the private information of the patentees to weed out the patents 
that are expected to have the least value. We first discuss how a system of 
renewal fees could accomplish such weeding. The current system of renewal 
fees that is in place in virtually all countries already accomplish some weeding 
by shortening the practical life of a majority of all issued patents. We then turn 
to the question of whether a system of tradable permits might accomplish the 
weeding in a more efficient manner. 
A. Using Renewal Fees to Weed the Thicket 
While many think of patents as having a fixed twenty-year term, the reality 
is that patentees have to repeatedly pay renewal fees to keep their patents 
effective over the full twenty years. These “maintenance” or “renewal” fees are 
required in virtually every country. The United States requires patentees to pay 
maintenance fees at three different points during the twenty-year term if they 
wish to preserve the validity of their patent: 
Three and a half years after issuance, a patentee must pay $900 or the patent 
will expire at the four year point. Seven and a half years after issuance, the 
patentee must pay $2,300 or the patent will expire at the eight year point, and 
eleven and a half years after issuance, the patentee must pay $3,800 or the 
55. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1634, 1638-40.  
56. See, e.g., John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 492 (2003) (suggesting 
that the non-obviousness standard should be raised in certain industies); cf. Robert M. Hunt, 
Nonobviousness and the Incentive to Innovate: An Economic Analysis of Intellectual 
Property Reform 37-38 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Research Dep’t, Working Paper No. 
99-3, 1999) (proposing different non-obviousness standards for different industries). 
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patent will expire at the twelve year point. Even though there is a uniform 
patent term for all patents (twenty years from the date of the application), 
renewal fees create a de facto differentiation in patent terms.57 
 As economist Ariel Pakes long ago observed, a patentee can be seen as 
having an option to tailor the duration of the patent length.58 
In other countries, the payment of renewal fees tends to occur annually. For 
example, a twenty-year European patent has renewal fees that have to be paid 
from the third patent year onwards to maintain protection. A twenty-year 
Japanese patent has the first three year’s renewal fees paid together, and for 
subsequent annual fees, “the applicant can pay either yearly or in advance.”59 
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The fees are relatively small and tend to be calibrated to covering some of 
the costs of operating the respective country’s patent offices.60 In Japan, for 
57. Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1525-26 
(2005) (citations omitted); see 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)-(g) (2007). The maintenance fees for 
small entities are half these amounts. Id. If a patent expires due to non-payment of 
maintenance fees, it can be reissued within twenty-four months if the patentee pays a 
surcharge of $700 or $1640 and convinces the USPTO that the late payment was 
unavoidable or unintentional. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.378 (2003); id. § 1.20(h). The United States 
did not charge maintenance fees prior to 1982. 
58. Ariel Pakes, Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European 
Patent Stocks, 54 ECONOMETRICA 755, 756 (1986). 
59. TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION, TRILATERAL STATISTICAL REPORT: 2005 EDITION 39 
(2006), available at http://www.trilateral.net/tsr/tsr_2005/tsr2005.pdf.  
60. See Joshua S. Gans, Stephen P. King & Ryan Lampe, 4 TOPICS IN THEORETICAL 
ECON. 1 (2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/bejte/topics/vol4/iss1/art6. 
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example, the renewal fees for the fourth to the sixth year are only $74 plus 
$5.48 per patent claim; for the seventh to ninth year, they are $222 plus $17.36 
per claim. For the tenth to the twentieth year, they are $742 and $58.49 per 
claim.61 
Nonetheless, these rather modest renewal fees have been quite successful 
in reducing the effective life of patents. Figure 1 shows that a large proportion 
of granted patents in the United States, Europe, and Japan are not maintained 
for their entire twenty-year life.62 
In the United States, more than 50% of all patents are not maintained after 
fourteen years. The median life of European patents is twelve years, and the 
median life for Japanese patents is just nine years. At the end of twenty years, 
less than 10% of European and Japanese patents and less than 40% of U.S. 
patents are still in effect.63 
The impact of the rather modest renewal fees on effective patent life has 
been exploited by economists in a number of ways. Empiricists have used the 
willingness of patentees to exercise (or not exercise) their continuation options 
to estimate the distribution of patent values—or more precisely, the distribution 
of values for patent protection.64 Since, as noted previously, even these modest 
renewal fees cause most patentees to relinquish their patents, it is not surprising 
that the median value of patents (or more precisely, of patent protection) is 
often estimated to be less than $10,000.65 These numbers have also been used 
to produce better estimates of the number of patents that are in effect, as well as 
“value-weighted” patent counts.66 An analysis of renewal rates can therefore 
61. See Japan Patent Office: Schedule of Fees, http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/ 
index.htm. These prices derive from fees listed in Yen by the Japan Patent Office using the 
November 12, 2007, exchange rate of $1 to ¥109.42. 
62. This figure is reproduced from TRILATERIAL CO-OPERATION, TRILATERAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT: 2006 EDITION 41 fig.4.8 (2007), available at http://www.trilateral.net/ 
tsr/tsr_2006/tsr_2006.pdf. The underlying data is available at http://www.trilateral.net/tsr/ 
tsr_2006/annex/ 2006_web_annex.xls.    
63. Id. 
64. See, e.g., Ariel Pakes & Mark Schankerman, The Rate of Obsolescence of Patents, 
Research Gestation Lags, and the Private Rate of Return to Research Resources, in R & D, 
PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 73, 73-74 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984); Jean Olson Lanjouw, 
Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimations of Patent Value, 65 
REV. ECON. STUD. 671, 671 (1998); Pakes, supra note 58, at 755; Mark Schankerman, How 
Valuable Is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 77 
(1998); Mark Schankerman & Ariel Pakes, Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in 
European Countries During the Post-1950 Period, 96 ECON. J. 1052, 1052 (1986); Jean O. 
Lanjouw, Ariel Pakes & Jonathan Putnam, How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual 
Property: Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 5741, 1996). 
65. Schankerman, supra note 64, at 93 (concluding that the median private value of 
patent rights, in 1980 dollars, amounted to only $1631 in the pharmaceutical industry, $1594 
in the chemical field, $2930 in the mechanical field, and $3159 in electronics, excluding 
Japan).   
66. See Lanjouw et al., supra note 64. 
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allow us to make progress on the problem that Mark Lemley and Kimberly 
Moore have noted:  
While we can calculate the number of patents filed before June 8, 1995 which 
have yet to expire due to term end, and can therefore get an idea of the 
maximum number of potentially enforceable patents (1,300,000), we cannot 
calculate the exact number that are still enforceable or the number of potential 
submarine patents in that group.67 
Economic theorists in the last decade have also made progress modeling 
the potential beneficial uses of renewal fees as a policy tool. Articles by 
Suzanne Scotchmer and by Francesca Cornelli and Mark Schankerman have 
shown how a patent system with renewal fees can economize on the private 
information of patentees.68 Cornelli and Schankerman, for example, have 
shown that a renewal fee system can give patentees with more productive 
opportunities the incentive to invest more in R&D.69 Moreover, their model 
suggests how the current structure of patent renewal fees should be modified. 
The current structure imposes a regressive tax on patentee profits: low-value 
patentees who abandon their patents early, end up paying more than 50% of 
their profits as renewal fees, whereas high-value patentees who maintain their 
patents for the full term, end up paying less than 5% of their profits as renewal 
fees. Cornelli and Schankerman estimate that an optimal structure of patent 
renewal fees should have a progressive character: taxing less than 3% of profits 
for patents that are low value (and cancelled early), but taxing more than 8% of 
expected profits for high-value patents that are renewed to last the entire 
twenty-year term.70 
This first generation of articles models static innovation, in which only one 
person has a potential idea (no patent races), and there is no possibility of 
follow-on innovation. The latter point especially distinguishes their analyses 
from the prior Subpart’s argument about the potential usefulness of weeding 
the patent thicket so that subsequent inventors retain some room to operate. But 
the fact that these articles see the possibility for more rapidly rising renewal 
fees in models without the “thicket” problem suggests to us that weeding 
strategies may be even more appropriate when we take into account the 
problems of follow-on investment. 
67. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 
B.U. L. REV. 63, 84 n.81 (2004).  
68. Francesca Cornelli & Mark Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 
30 RAND J. ECON. 197, 197-98 (1999); Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Optimality of the Patent 
Renewal System, 30 RAND J. ECON. 181, 181 (1999).  
69. Cornelli & Schankerman, supra note 68, at 198 (“[D]ifferentiated patent lives can 
be welfare improving because of an ‘incentive effect’: allowing firms with high R&D 
capabilities to choose longer patent lives gives these firms an incentive to invest more R&D 
resources.”).  
70. Id. at 208 fig.3. 
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B. Should Government Choose the Quantity Instead of the Price? 
While renewal fees certainly have reduced the number of patents that are in 
effect over time, this same effect could be accomplished by a license system in 
which the number of licenses that were in effect was limited and patentees had 
to acquire a patent as well as a license in order to have an effective patent. 
The concept of tradable permits has long been a favorite of economists and 
has begun to gain traction with policy makers and academics. A tradable permit 
system can lead to the more efficient allocation of resources by allowing 
resources to flow to their highest value users. Such market-based systems have 
been implemented successfully in several arenas, most notably in air pollution 
control and in commercial fishing licenses. 
Title IV of the the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act included a 
national tradable permit system for SO2 emissions.71 Permits are granted to 
producers of SO2 based on their prior production levels, and at the end of each 
year, each producer must hold enough permits to cover their emission of SO2. 
Additional permits may be banked (or carried over) for the next year or sold to 
other producers or third parties.72 This tradable system allows for companies 
who can reduce their emissions at low cost to sell their excess SO2 permits to 
companies who bear a higher cost of reduction. In the fifteen years since this 
system was put into place, there is evidence that it has been highly effective: 
SO2 emissions were reduced by nearly thirty percent beyond the required level, 
and compliance with the program has been almost perfect.73 Additionally, the 
tradable permits program has been estimated to create a cost saving of sixteen 
to twenty-five percent relative to a uniform emissions standard for SO2.74 
These cost savings are less than some supporters hoped for when a market-
based permit program was first proposed,75 but the program has generally been 
considered a success. 
Commercial fishing is a second industry that has benefited from the use of 
tradable permits. Commercial fishing is a textbook tragedy of the commons 
problem, in which every fisherman has the incentive to catch as many fish as 
possible, thereby leading to overfishing. This drives down prices in the 
marketplace and reduces the stock of fish in the wild, leading to endangerment 
or even extinction of certain species of fish. An estimated seventy percent of 
the world’s fish species are now either fully exploited or depleted, and intense 
71. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 122 
(2005).  
72. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE EPA ACID RAIN PROGRAM 3 
(1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/ docs/1999report.pdf.  
73. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 71, at 122. 
74. Nathaniel O. Keohane, What Did the Market Buy? Cost Savings Under the U.S. 
Tradeable Permits Program for Sulfur Dioxide 23 (Yale Ctr. for Envtl. Law and Policy, 
Working Paper No. ES-33, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=465320. 
75. Id. at 22-23 (noting that prior estimates anticipated even greater cost savings). 
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competition for the remaining fish creates economic waste.76 The traditional 
government response to overfishing has been intense regulation of many 
aspects of the fishing industry, which has proven costly to enforce and still 
provides incentives for fishermen to search for loopholes and increase their 
own catch.77 
In response to these continuing problems, new programs of transferable 
fishing quotas granted to individual fishermen have been adopted by several 
countries, including New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, Canada, and Papua New 
Guinea.78 Much like the pollution permits, these fishing licenses are fully 
tradable and ensure that fishing rights flow to those fishermen who can use 
them most effectively. Moreover, the programs allow the government to 
maintain a strict control on the quantity of fish being caught, thereby 
preventing overfishing. This program has been especially successful in New 
Zealand, where fish stocks are now healthier and there is evidence of increased 
profitability among fishermen.79 
The successes of tradable permit programs in air pollution control and 
commercial fishing have led to proposals for tradable permits in many other 
fields. Market-based permit concepts are available in fields as widely divergent 
as milk production in Canada,80 red deer hunting in Scotland,81 and even 
wildlife conservation.82 As tradable permits become more common in different 
fields of government action, it is only natural to consider their extension into 
patent protection, which is the concern of this Article. 
But would a system of tradable patent licenses be superior to a renewal-fee 
system? This is a classic “prices vs. quantities” question that has arisen in a 
variety of other contexts.83 Martin Weitzman, in his classic article, Prices vs. 
Quantities, noted: 
76. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 71, at 123. 
77. Id. at 124. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 124-25. 
80. See Kevin Chen & Karl Meilke, The Simple Analytics of Transferable Production 
Quota: Implications for the Marginal Cost of Ontario Milk Production, 46 CAN. J. AGRIC. 
ECON. 37 (1998).  
81. See Douglas MacMillan, Tradeable Hunting Obligations—A New Approach to 
Regulating Red Deer Numbers in the Scottish Highlands?, 71 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 261, 261 
(2004). 
82. See Ricardo Bayon, A Bull Market in . . . Woodpeckers?, MILKEN INST. REV., Mar. 
2002, at 30, available at http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/review/2002_3/ 
30_39.pdf.  
83. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523 (1984); 
William Poole, Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic 
Macro Model, 84 Q.J. ECON. 197, 197 (1970); Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 
REV. ECON. STUD. 477, 477 (1974). Indeed, the analysis and figures of patenting in this Part 
closely parallel the analysis of affirmative action quotas and credits found in Ian Ayres, 
Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781 (1996). 
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From a strictly theoretical point of view there is really nothing to recommend 
one mode of control over the other. This notwithstanding, I think it is a fair 
generalization to say that the average economist in the Western marginalist 
tradition has at least a vague preference toward indirect control by prices, just 
as the typical non-economist leans toward the direct regulation of quantities. 
 . . . 
 A reason often cited for the theoretical superiority of prices as planning 
instruments is that their use allegedly economizes on information. . . . [I]t is 
neither easier nor harder to name the right prices than the right quantities 
because in principle exactly the same information is needed to correctly 
specify either.84 
Just as Weitzman questioned the “vague preference” that economists have 
toward effluent taxes, our purpose here is to show that the preference for 
renewal fees is overstated or possibly misplaced. To see why a regime with a 
limited number of patent licenses might be superior to a regime with renewal 
fees, imagine a one-period model in which a patentee would either have to pay 
a single fee in order to make her license active or would have to purchase one 
of a limited number of licenses. To implement these regimes, the government 
would have to set either a price (a renewal fee) or a quantity (the number of 
licenses to be issued). 
In a simple model with complete information, the optimal (price or 
quantity) regulation would turn on the marginal net private benefits and the 
marginal net social costs of patenting. The concept of net private benefits 
captures the expected profits from patent protection minus the costs of 
producing, prosecuting, and enforcing the patent. The concept of net social 
costs refers to all the social costs and benefits of patenting, excluding only the 
costs and benefits that accrue to the marginal patentee herself. Society enjoys 
many benefits from patenting—including, of course, the way that patent 
protection spurs innovation and then makes that innovation common 
knowledge. But for the reasons discussed in Part I, there are strong reasons to 
expect that a patent thicket that becomes too thick can produce net social costs 
that on the margin are higher than the net private benefits to the patentee. 
These stylized assumptions are depicted in Figure 2. This figure assumes, 
following the logic of Part I, that the marginal net social costs of patenting 
(labeled MSC) rise as the quantity of enforceable patents increases. Further, 
because of diminishing marginal returns, the private net benefit of the marginal 
patent (labeled MPB) declines as the number of enforceable patents grows. 
This latter assumption does not mean that the last patent issued in a given time 
period is less valuable than the first, but simply that if we arrayed all the patents 
issued in, for instance, a year, the least valuable patent is worth less than the 
most valuable. 
84. Weitzman, supra note 83, at 477-78 (first emphasis added). But see Louis Kaplow 
& Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. 
ECON. REV. 1, 1-2 (2002) (acknowledging that Weitzman’s view has been accepted by many 
economists but arguing that corrective taxes are a superior way of controlling externalities). 
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In simplistic “models” of this kind, social welfare is of course maximized 
at the point where the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits. Accordingly, 
the government would want to set either the price or the quantity at the point 
where the marginal net private benefit to patentees of an additional patent was 
set equal to the marginal net social cost of issuing more patents. These amounts 
are depicted in Figure 2 as P* and Q*, respectively. 
 
Figure 2. Assessing the “Marginal Social Cost” (MSC) and the “Marginal 
Private Benefit” (MPB) of Patents 
If the government had complete information about the marginal costs and 
benefits of patenting, then either price or quantity regulation would produce an 
identical equilibrium. Indeed, with this kind of complete information, the 
government could do even better by just offering patent protection to those 
ideas that produce a net social benefit and by paying these patentees a lump 
sum instead of granting them distortionary monopoly rights. But, as has long 
been known, all the important issues of developing optimal intellectual 
property rights turn on the government’s imperfect information—or possibly 
the question of how best the government might economize on the patentee’s 
(and others’) private information.85 
85. See Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and 
Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691-92 (1983). Weitzman made a similar 
point: 
. . . In an environment of complete knowledge and perfect certainty there is a formal identity 
between the use of prices and quantities as planning instruments.  
 If there is any advantage to employing price or quantity control modes, therefore, it must 
be due to inadequate information or uncertainty. 
Weitzman, supra note 83, at 480. For a parallel analysis in the affirmative action context, see 
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Therefore, to make the price vs. quantity question interesting, we need to 
introduce some uncertainty about how patentees will react to a renewal fee as 
opposed to a licensing scheme. A marginal net private benefit curve (MPB 
curve) can be thought of as the patentees’ reaction function. Its position will 
determine, for example, how many patentees will find it worthwhile to pay a 
particular licensing fee. To make prices and quantities non-equivalent policy 
instruments, imagine that the government is uncertain about the position of the 
MPB curve. There are many types of uncertainty that the government might 
face, but for one stylized example, assume that the slope of the MPB curve is 
known but the intercept with MSC is not known. For stylized concreteness, 
imagine that half of the time the MPB curve is shifted up by epsilon and half 
the time it is shifted down by epsilon. This uncertainty is depicted in Figure 3 
by the dotted lines that are parallel to, but lie above and below, the expected 
MPB curve (depicted by the solid line). 
 
Figure 3. An Example in Which Patent Quotas Are Less Efficient than 
Renewal Fees 
With these assumptions in place, it is possible to explore graphically 
whether price or quantity regulation is likely to be more efficient. A more 
tailored price or quantity rule would of course depend on the position of the 
MPB curve. The optimum patent quantity levels for the two possible states of 
the world are depicted in Figure 3 by q*L and q*H, which represent the 
quantities where the MSC curve intersects the two possible MPB curves. But 
Ayres, supra note 83. 
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because of the government’s limited information, simple price or quantity 
regulation cannot guarantee the optimum number of patents. 
Figure 3 can help us assess how well simple price or quantity regulations 
will succeed in tailoring actual patent levels to these optimal benchmarks. The 
licensing scheme induces a fixed quantity of enforceable patents with an 
equilibrium market price of the license equal to the point where the MPB curve 
intersects with the fixed quantity Q*. When the private benefit curve is 
unexpectedly low, the quantity regulation induces too much patenting 
(Q*>q*L). Under these circumstances, the marginal social cost of patenting at 
Q* is epsilon greater than the marginal private benefit. The total inefficiency 
caused by this oversupply is represented in Figure 3 by a triangle drawn 
between the optimal and actual quantity (labeled B). Because, as Figure 3 
indicates, the marginal social cost remains above the marginal private benefit at 
all points between q*L and Q*, the triangle area labeled B represents the total 
loss in welfare from the quantity regulation’s failure to tailor a lower quantity 
when the net private benefits of patenting are unexpectedly low. 
Tradable licenses create an analogous inefficiency by inducing too little 
patenting when the private benefits of patenting are unexpectedly high. When 
the private benefits of patenting are high, the optimum level of patenting (q*H) 
is higher than the best level that an imperfectly informed government can 
identify (Q*). When this is true, the private benefits of patenting on the margin 
at Q* will be greater than the social cost. The inefficiency associated with this 
shortfall (between Q* and q*H) is depicted by an analogous triangle (labeled 
C). 
Figure 3 also shows, however, that a simple price regulation fails to induce 
the optimal level of patenting. Quantity regulation is inefficient because the 
quantity of patenting does not vary with the strength of private benefits, but 
price regulation is inefficient because it causes the quantity of patenting to vary 
too much. 
When private benefits are unexpectedly low, quantity regulation induces 
too much patenting (Q*>q*L), but Figure 3 shows that price regulation induces 
too little participation. Patentees responding to a renewal fee cost of P* will 
only renew patents up to the point where the marginal private benefit equals the 
cost of the renewal. In Figure 3, this renewal point occurs at qRL. But at this 
level, the marginal net private benefits of patenting are larger than the marginal 
social costs. The inefficiency associated with this shortfall is represented by the 
smaller triangle between qRL and q*L (labeled A). An analogous inefficiency 
is created when private benefits are unexpectedly high. The price regulation 
now induces too much minority participation (qRH > Q*), which is depicted by 
an analogous small triangle between q*H and qRH (labeled D). 
Comparing the inefficiencies of price and quantity regulations, Figure 3 
reveals the conventional result. The fixed-quantity regulation produces a less-
nuanced outcome than the price regulation. The price regulation is better 
tailored because it produces enforceable patenting levels (qRL and qRH) that 
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are closer to the optimal levels (q*L and q*H, respectively).86 Price regulation 
induces more variation in enforceable patenting. And for these assumed 
marginal cost and benefit curves, making the level of effective patenting 
sensitive to the size of private patent values is more efficient than having the 
patenting level be completely invariant. 
The residual inefficiency of price regulation is caused by patentees 
ignoring the social costs of marginal increases in patenting; they instead only 
internalize the constant marginal cost of the renewal fee. But, as drawn in 
Figure 3, the externality caused by the flat pricing regulation is relatively small 
because the marginal cost curve is itself relatively flat—meaning that under a 
price regulation there are slight differences between the marginal costs to 
society and the marginal costs imposed by the simple (quantity invariant) 
renewal fee. 
If the analysis stopped here, there would be little value added by this 
economic modeling. Consistent with the current legal embrace of renewal fees, 
Figure 3 shows that setting the quantity of tradable licenses is less efficient than 
having government set a renewal price. And even though this graph is for a 
single price and quantity, one might imagine the same type of graph showing 
that a renewal-fee system is clearly preferable to a quota on patent licenses for 
each year of a patent’s potential life. 
However, it turns out that it is easy to construct examples in which quantity 
regulation is more efficient than price regulation. Indeed, if we merely increase 
the slope of the social cost curve (MSC), setting the quantity becomes more 
efficient than setting the price. Figure 4 shows this possibility. 
As before, a system of renewal fees makes the level of effective patenting 
more sensitive to the private benefits of patenting. But in this case, the swings 
in effective patenting are excessive compared to what optimally tailored (full-
information) patenting levels would be. The fixed quantity (Q*) is closer to the 
full-information optimal levels (q*H and q*L) than are the levels induced by a 
simple renewal fee (qRH and qRL). The deviations from the optimal level of 
effective patenting create analogous inefficiencies for price and quantity 
regulations, but in Figure 4, the inefficiency of renewal fees is greater than that 
for a fixed licensing quantity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86. Graphically, q*L - qRL < Q* - q*L and qRH - q*H < q*H - Q*. 
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Figure 4. An Example in Which Renewal Fees Are Less 
Efficient than Patent Quotas 
This geometry suggests that quantity regulation will become more efficient 
than price regulation as the marginal social cost curve (MSC) becomes steeper 
relative to the marginal private benefit curve (MPB). Indeed, in this simple 
graph, quantity regulation will be more efficient than price regulation whenever 
the slope of the MSC curve is greater than (the absolute value of) the MPB 
slope. Why would this be so? As discussed above, the slopes of the MSC and 
MPB curves determine how sensitive effective patenting will be to shifts in 
private patent benefits. When the MSC curve is relatively flat, price regulation 
causes patentees to face a fee that, regardless of their private benefit, is 
approximately equal to the marginal social costs of enforceable patents. Flat 
MSC curves thus suggest that price regulation will be effective in inducing 
levels of patenting that are relatively close to the full-information optimum. 
When the MSC curve is steep, however, then shifts in the private benefits of 
patenting will cause the social cost curve to substantially diverge from a fixed 
renewal fee as the private benefit curve varies above or below its expected 
value. When the MSC curve is steep (relative to the MSB curve), pricing 
regulations will produce too great fluctuations in the level of effective patenting 
as patentees look to the size of the renewal fee in deciding whether to pay to 
make their patent enforceable instead of considering the diverging social costs 
of enforcements. 
Economists tend to think of price regulations (effluent taxations and the 
like) as allowing the courts to economize on the information of private parties–
—in this case, allowing the patentees to choose the level of effective patenting 
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based on their privately-known valuations.87 But the reactions of private parties 
in setting the level of effective patenting can, somewhat paradoxically, be less 
well-tailored than a fixed-quantity standard that does not allow patentees’ 
action to vary the number of patents in effect. The fixed-pricing regulation 
causes patentees to systematically overshoot in their efforts to expand or 
contract the effective quantity of patents above or below the expected level. 
When this overshooting effect is large enough, the fixed effective quantity of 
tradable licenses can better emulate the full-information optimum than a 
simple, single-price-per-period renewal system. 
The analysis of Part I gives us some reason to think that quantity regulation 
may in fact be more efficient than price regulation. The idea that patent systems 
become more socially costly as more “thickets” emerge suggests that the 
marginal social costs will likely be rising sharply. And as Figure 4 indicates, 
steep MSC curves tilt the efficiency analysis toward quantity regulation. 
C. Regulating Both Price and Quantity 
While the foregoing graphs are sufficient to show that fixed-quantity 
regulations can be more efficient than single-price regulations, it is important to 
realize that government might be able to do better by adopting a regime that is 
a mixture of price and quantity regulations. Specifically, the government might 
make the number of licenses issued be a function of the equilibrium bids. 
Instead of being a fixed vertical line, the supply of licenses might instead be an 
upward sloping curve that the government sets to coincide with the net social 
costs of patenting. 
Graphically, the government’s task would be to fit the quantity of licenses 
to the MSC curve of the previous Subparts. An upward-sloping license-supply 
curve would potentially reduce the information burdens on government. Instead 
of trying to assess the position of the MPB curve, the government would only 
need to assess the position of the MSC curve.88 Making the license-supply 
curve equal to the external social costs of patenting would, in theory at least, 
cause patentees to internalize the total costs and benefits of creating an 
enforceable patent.89 The patentees would receive the private benefits of an 
87. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 84, at 14 (noting that corrective taxes 
leave control decisions to individual firms); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules 
Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725 (1996) (pointing 
out that liability rules allow the state to harness the information of private parties).  
88. However, the government would need to assess a longer span of the MSC curve 
instead of just assessing the local point at which the MSC and MPB curves intersect. There 
may be circumstances in which the latter assessment might be easier. See Richard R.W. 
Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken 
Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 284-99 (2002) (developing a framework 
for choosing between property rules and liability rules). 
89. A similar point was made by Ryan Lampe and Anthony Niblett, The Economics of 
Patent Design: A Selective Survey 19 (Intellectual Prop. Research Inst. of Austl., Working 
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enforceable patent if they went forward, and they would have to pay a price to 
procure the license that would emulate what would otherwise be the external 
social costs of patenting. If the license-supply curve were simply the MSC 
curve, then the patentees would only purchase a license if the marginal benefit 
to themselves individually was greater than the marginal cost to society. 
Of course, to assess the schedule of increasing social costs of additional 
patents is far from an easy task. But this Subpart suggests that relying simply 
on price regulations, to the exclusion of quantity and quantity/price regulations, 
artificially constrains the toolkit of intellectual-property policymakers. 
III. HOW MIGHT A TRADABLE LICENSE SCHEME BE IMPLEMENTED? 
This Part describes in a bit more detail how a system of tradable licenses 
might be implemented. For simplicity, imagine that the system would only 
apply to newly-issued patents, so that previously-issued patents would be 
governed by the pre-existing maintenance-fee system. Licenses would be 
described by two variables: a particular patent-issue year (e.g., 2010) and the 
time period of the patent’s life that is covered (e.g., years 5 to 8). Thus, a 
2010/years 5-8 license would cover only the years 5 to 8 of patents issued in 
2010. To keep things similar to the current U.S. patent system, patentees will 
be required to purchase licenses every 4 years to preserve the effectiveness of 
their patents. The initial patent fees would make the patent in force for year 0 to 
4. To keep a patent in force after the initial 4 years, a patentee would have to 
obtain ownership of a year 5 to 8 license for their particular patent issue-year. 
Afterward, a patentee who wants to keep a patent in force will need to obtain 
licenses for years 9 through 12, 13 through 16, and 17 through 20. (The current 
maintenance-fee system only requires patentees to purchases extended length in 
years 4, 8, and 12—but because of our concerns with the thicket problem, we 
would require relicensing in year 16 as well.) As with renewal fees, failure to 
acquire a license at the start of any particular four-year term would render the 
patent ineffective in all future years. 
At the beginning of an issuance year, the USPTO would auction a 
predetermined number of licenses covering the various periods of patent life for 
all patents being issued that year. We imagine that the auction would be a 
sealed-bid auction, similar to the type used for the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s annual SO2 allowance auction.90 For example, at the beginning of 
Paper No. 06/03, 2003) (“This policy has been introduced (in part) to prevent inefficient use 
of the patent system. In order to ensure optimality, the patent renewal fee at time t should 
equal the marginal social cost at time t.”). 
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7651o(d)(2) (2000). In order to comply with the cap on the level of 
air-polluting emissions established by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990), the EPA distributed allowances to certain industries that 
limited how much they could pollute; each allowance permitted the industry to emit a certain 
unit of air pollution. A small proportion of allowances were reserved by the EPA and sold at 
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2010, the USPTO would issue a certain number of 2010/5 licenses (granting 
protection for patents issued in 2010 for years 5 to 8 of the patent’s life), a 
smaller number of 2010/9 licenses, an even smaller number of 2010/13 
licenses, and a yet smaller number of 2010/17 licenses. The decreasing supply 
of licenses for each patent cohort suggests a kind of musical chairs in which 
some of the potentially enforceable patents will necessarily become 
unenforceable. 
Anyone would be able to buy these licenses initially, and the licenses 
would be freely alienable in a secondary market. The official owner of record 
would be maintained by the USPTO. There would be no requirement that 
owners be patentees of patents issued in the relevant year. But if an owner 
wanted to use a license to make a particular patent enforceable for a particular 
time period, the owner would have to designate to the USPTO a particular 
license as applying to a particular patent. 
In the last twenty years, the number of patents issued by the USPTO has 
been increasing at about a 4.6% rate. In 2000, the USPTO issued 157,495 
utility patents. To replicate the same decay in enforceability that is occurring 
under the current system of maintenance fees, we might initially issue: 
 
 2010/5 2010/9 2010/13 2010/17 
No. of auctioned licenses 132,000 99,000 73,000 56,000 
 
The first three figures are taken by looking at the rate of patent expiration 
that occurred in 199191 and applying it (before rounding to the nearest 
thousand) to the initial level of patenting in 2000 (157,495 patents). The fourth 
figure for the number of 2010/17 licenses was calculated by continuing the 
same (geometric) average rate of decay. 
Now that we have specified with a bit more particularity how a tradable 
licensing system would operate (at least) initially, we can say a bit more about 
the benefits that might accrue under such a system. As we said before, tradable 
licenses would offer more flexibility than the current system. Patentees could, 
at the time of patenting, secure all the licenses that they would need to keep 
 
an annual sealed-bid auction. See generally Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: 
An Analysis of the Utility Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur 
Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001). The precise mechanism of 
the SO2 auction has been described in the following way: 
Interested parties submit bids indicating the number of allowances they seek to purchase and 
the price they are willing to pay. The Chicago Board of Trade [which the EPA has designated 
to run the auction] determines the price that would lead to the sale of all the available 
allowances. All bids at or above that price are then accepted, with each successful bidder 
paying the amount it bid. 
Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable 
Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 658 
(2001). 
91. See Moore, supra note 57, at 1527-31. 
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their patent in force for the full twenty-year term. This could, in a small way, 
save on the current transaction cost of having to remember to pay your 
maintenance fee. Alternatively, patentees could wait and see if the value of 
their patent and the value of the licenses in the secondary market make 
continued enforcement worthwhile. Tradable licenses let assets flow to the 
highest valuers—in sharp contrast to maintenance fees, which are not tradable. 
Thus, a system that simply tried to replicate the rate of expiration under the 
current maintenance-fee system might be more efficient. 
But we think that even more gains in efficiency can be achieved by 
gradually increasing the amount of weeding that takes place. And here the 
annual growth rate in issuing patents of about 5% comes to our aid. Simply 
maintaining any fixed level of issued licensing will gradually become more and 
more restrictive as the number of newly-issued patents increases. We need to 
consider how much more we should let the rate of licensing bind before it 
should adjust to accommodate the growing rate of patenting. 
Quantitatively tailoring the patent system is the Herculean burden. Ever 
since Nordhaus,92 economists have been able to produce theories about, but 
precious few numbers on, the optimal length (or breadth) of patents. In theory, 
we know we want to weed until the marginal cost of a license equals the 
marginal social cost of patenting, but we do not yet know how to measure the 
marginal social cost.93 A scheme of tradable licenses, however, gives us more 
information about the marginal patent. The USPTO will get to see the market 
price for the fifth, ninth, thirteenth, and seventeenth year licenses for each 
cohort. The license prices themselves (both in the auction and in the secondary 
market) will provide some information about what kinds of inventions are 
being deterred. For example, if the year five license price rises to seven figures, 
we are probably weeding too much because patentees will not find it 
92. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL 
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969) (discussing the optimal patent system). For 
subsequent studies of the issue of patent scope, see, for example, Howard F. Chang, Patent 
Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 34 (1995); Julie E. 
Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. 
REV. 1 (2001); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 
RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990); Hugo A. Hopenhayn & Matthew F. Mitchell, Innovation 
Variety and Patent Breadth, 32 RAND J. ECON. 152 (2001); Paul Klemperer, How Broad 
Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990); Robert P. Merges 
& Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 
(1990).  
93. See, e.g., FRITZ MACHLUP, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE 
PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (“If we did not have a patent system, it would be 
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to 
recommend instituting one.”); George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About 
Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE 
ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 19, 19 (John Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 
1986) (“The ratio of empirical demonstration to assumption in [the patent] literature must be 
very close to zero.”).  
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worthwhile to invent many useful things if they expect to pay more than a 
million dollars to keep their inventions alive after just four years. But beyond 
just the price information, the USPTO will be able to observe the identity of 
patents that are not extended. If the owners of socially valuable patents do not 
find it worthwhile to extend their patents’ lives, policymakers should worry 
about whether similar future inventions will even come into being. 
Finally, a word is in order about the possibility that non-patent owners will 
purchase the licenses solely for the purpose of reducing the number of patents 
that can be legally enforced. Remember that, under our scheme, the USPTO 
places no requirement that licenses purchasers be patent owners at the time of 
purchase or that they use the licenses to make actual patents enforceable. This 
means that Larry Lessig or the Free Software Foundation might purchase 
licenses just to expand the intellectual commons. Just as third graders and other 
environmentalists sometimes purchase SO2 licenses to “park” them and reduce 
the amount of pollution, intellectual property communitarians would be free to 
purchase patent licenses so as to exacerbate the musical chairs shortage. 
This is, all in all, a good thing. Such “parking” not only democratizes the 
effective supply of patent enforcement—it also increases efficiency. If a third 
grade class believes that it values a 2020/5 license more than the marginal 
patent owner, then efficiency is enhanced by letting the license flow to the 
highest valuer. 
On the other hand, efficiency would not be enhanced if the end users of a 
patented product purchased a license only so that the particular patentee would 
not be able to enforce its patent, charge the end user, and thereby earn a return 
on its innovative effort. But it should be emphasized that the licenses are not 
tied to particular patents, so an end user would not be able to purchase the right 
to stop a particular patentee from charging a monopoly price unless she 
purchased all the available licenses for that patent-issuance year. Such an 
undergoing would, of course, be a prohibitively expensive means for an end 
user to protect herself from a patentee’s monopoly pricing. More generally, we 
believe that, as with other broadly available commodities, “cornering the 
market” risks are low. But they could be handled with regulations that parallel 
the market-manipulation prohibitions of the security markets. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we explored how price- and quantity-based regulation of 
patents may help overcome patent thickets and clear the path for future 
innovation. The main innovation of the Article itself was to introduce the 
option of tradable patent rights as a policy tool for combating overpatenting. 
Admittedly, the analysis leaves many important questions open. Should we 
weed progressively more over the life of a patent cohort, or should we weed 
more assiduously at the beginning of a cohort’s life? Should we weed with 
price, quantities, or some combination of prices and quantities? Can price or 
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quantity regulations weed out socially costly patents without unduly burdening 
patents that are on net socially beneficial? 
Nevertheless, we hope to have at least shown that policymakers have an 
array of weeding tools that go well beyond simply increasing the initial 
standards for non-obviousness. Price and quantity regulations deserve to be 
among the policymaker’s gardening implements as they open up new 
possibilities for economizing on patentees’ private information throughout the 
life of the patent. 
 
